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practical matters. The book is replete with applications of what initially 
seem to be unrelated philosophical areas to issues pertinent to faith and 
humility. For some examples, epistemic contextualism, fallibilism, action 
theory, counterfactuals, dispositions/masking/finking, Frege’s puzzle/
opacity of propositional content, Bayesian conditionalization, epistemic 
coherentism, the basing relation, analyticity, and the preface paradox are 
all brought to bear on issues related to faith and humility. It is my hope 
that this integration of other philosophical areas with work on faith and 
humility will lead to applied work by specialists in these other fields and 
to more widespread work on both faith and humility.
God, Science, and Religious Diversity: A Defense of Theism , by Robert T. Lehe. 
Cascade Books, 2018. 188 pages. $25 (paperback).
MICHAEL THUNE, Joliet Junior College
A currently popular belief is that the advances in scientific knowledge 
over the last few centuries have demonstrated that science is incompat-
ible with religious belief—the latter counting, at best, as “faith” and not 
knowledge. A second currently popular belief is that the existence of a 
plurality of different religions, each containing adherents that are sin-
cere and morally upright—and whose characteristic beliefs are matters 
of “faith” rather than knowledge—means that it is wrongheaded (to say 
the least) to have any intellectual commitment to the truth of a given set 
of religious beliefs if this commitment involves thinking that any of the 
beliefs found in other religions is false. Robert T. Lehe, in God, Science, 
and Religious Diversity, provides an academically rigorous and trenchant 
challenge to both of these popular beliefs. The intended audience seems 
to be manifold, including religious believers who feel uneasy about their 
own commitment to certain religious beliefs in light of their awareness of 
the advance of science and of the plurality of religious traditions. But the 
book is also for skeptics, who may be surprised by Lehe’s well-articulated 
defense of the claim that “modern science is not only compatible with 
the existence of God, but . . . favors theism over metaphysical naturalism, 
the view that only the natural world exists and that all phenomena are 
governed entirely by the laws of physics” (1). While there are many other 
books that conjointly address the topics of science and religion, there aren’t 
as many that address science and religious diversity as twin challenges 
to particular religious belief and whose responses to these challenges are 
woven together in a unified, coherent, and compelling way. God, Science, 




and Religious Diversity does all of this masterfully. On the whole, the book 
is well-written, well-researched, and yet accessible to both philosophical 
and scientific non-specialists. It is also very fair-minded; indeed, I think 
Lehe even undersells his case in a few places.
Lehe argues for two main theses that are at once substantive, contro-
versial, and both philosophically and scientifically interesting: (1) that 
“modern scientific cosmology is not only compatible with religious inter-
pretations of reality but that it adds to the credibility of Christian theism”; 
and (2) that “consideration of how effectively different religious traditions 
harmonize their beliefs with modern science turns out to be helpful in the 
attempt to adjudicate conflicting truth claims between diverse religions” 
(2). Chapters 1 and 2 do some stage-setting (epistemological and other-
wise) and articulate challenges to a theistic worldview that are thought 
to be posed by science and by religious diversity. A popular assumption 
is that as far as religion has concerned science, it has functioned only as a 
“God-of-the-gaps” device by which we can temporarily cling to a religious 
explanation of various phenomena until a “real” explanation, from science, 
becomes available. Lehe reminds the reader that “[i]t is well documented 
not only that most of the pioneers of the modern scientific revolution were 
Christians motivated by religious passion in their scientific work, but also 
that to a large extent it was their assumption that the cosmos was created by 
a wise and rational God that convinced them that the world was rationally 
intelligible and could be investigated by human reason” (22)—and that 
typically, no such “God-of-the-gaps” approach is adopted by “thoughtful” 
or “sophisticated” theists (33). Lehe also points out that “the assumption 
of scientism, that whatever cannot be justified by the application of the 
scientific method cannot be legitimately accepted as knowledge” is “an 
arbitrary assumption”—one that is “not only not justified, but is (as has 
been pointed out many times since the days of Plato) incoherent and self-
refuting” (38–39).
Lehe argues in chapter 3 that even if methodological naturalism is ac-
cepted as the proper approach to doing science, such a methodology does 
not entail metaphysical naturalism—which, argues Lehe, has its own 
explanatory limitations. Referencing a list compiled by Michael Peterson 
that includes consciousness, self-consciousness, mind, rationality, truth, 
personhood, free will, responsibility, morality, agency, value, biological 
evolution, and even science itself, Lehe argues that these things are “im-
probable and surprising in a world of nothing but matter and energy” 
and that “[t]heism has more explanatory power than naturalism insofar as 
theism provides a metaphysical framework that makes it less surprising 
(than does naturalism) that we should find in the world these marvelous 
features that intractably resist naturalistic explanation and the existence of 
which seem vastly improbable from the perspective of naturalism” (60).
Drawing on recent scientific discoveries in Big Bang cosmology, chap-
ters 4 and 5 contain a timely treatment and thorough defense of the two 
premises of the kalam cosmological argument. Here, the reader will be led 
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on a tour through the landscape of contemporary cosmology (in a way 
that is accessible to the scientific non-specialist), after which Lehe con-
cludes that “the best scientific evidence supports the claim that the uni-
verse began to exist” (85). Lehe does not claim that this evidence proves 
the existence of God, but rather that “it is hard to find a better candidate” 
for the cause of the universe’s beginning than the God of the Bible, and 
that arguments like the kalam cosmological argument can make use of the 
Big Bang theory and thereby “support the plausibility of theism” (5).
Chapter 6 offers a fascinating look at recent scientific discoveries that 
point to several very finely-tuned parameters of the universe that must be 
present in order for life to be possible. These parameters include Planck’s 
constant, the gravitational constant, and the cosmological constant—all of 
which are not determined by the fundamental physical laws but which 
“determine such basic parameters as the strength and range of the funda-
mental forces of nature, the mass of the fundamental particles, the mass 
density of the universe, the rate of expansion of the universe, and several 
others” (5). Lehe considers the main alternative explanation to the “design 
hypothesis,” namely the “many-universes (or multiverse) hypothesis,” and 
argues that such an alternative yields several problematic consequences.
By this point in the book, Lehe has made a very solid and compelling 
case for the claim that there is robust scientific support for theistic belief, 
and for the claim that there are significant explanatory limitations to meta-
physical naturalism (which may be surprising to some readers, since even 
the question about whether there are such limitations to naturalism is not 
always well advertised)—and that these things make theism rationally 
preferable to naturalism. In the final three chapters, he turns his attention 
to the challenge to theistic belief posed by religious diversity. Lehe argues 
that, contrary to popular belief, “the fact of religious diversity does not 
undermine the possibility of rational assessment of religious truth claims 
and the adjudication of competing claims of diverse religions” (6). Chap-
ter 7 offers a presentation and critique of John Hick’s version of religious 
pluralism, while chapter 8 does the same with respect to Peter Byrne’s 
version. Lehe argues that Hick’s version suffers from its commitment to 
an underlying Kantian epistemological framework whereby Hick distin-
guishes reality as it is in itself (the “Real”) from reality as it appears to 
adherents of the different religious traditions. Hick’s theory suffers, ar-
gues Lehe, because it “entails either non-realism or polytheism,” since it 
implies that “either the various religious entities that different religions 
refer to have no relation to the Real-in-itself, in which case the theory col-
lapses into non-realism, or, on the contrary, the names of diverse religious 
entities are grounded in reality, in which case there are many different, 
real entities—many gods” (133).
Byrne’s theory, argues Lehe, is committed to three theses, as follows. 
First, there is a realist thesis: “All major religious traditions are equal in 
respect of making common reference to a single transcendent, sacred real-
ity”; second, a pluralist/soteriological thesis: “All major religious traditions 
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are likewise equal in respect of offering some means or other to human 
salvation”; and third, an agnostic thesis: “All traditions are to be seen as 
containing revisable, limited accounts of the nature of the sacred; none is 
certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm 
for interpreting the others” (138). Lehe argues that the first is in tension 
with (the first part of) the third. If, as the third thesis states, religions are 
revisable, then this calls into question the claim made in the first thesis that 
all major religious traditions are (or will remain) equal in making cognitive 
contact with the single transcendent and sacred reality. By way of Byrne’s 
second thesis, Lehe argues that “Byrne’s agnosticism about the details of 
the doctrines of particular religions [as in the third thesis] should cause 
reluctance to make any claims about the truth of what really constitutes 
salvation” (152)—and yet pluralists such as Byrne describe the soteriology 
of the major religions in terms of moral transformation and then claim that 
each of these religions is equally successful with respect to that transfor-
mation. But it seems that this is to define soteriology on the philosophical 
pluralist’s own terms rather than on the terms of the individual religious 
traditions themselves. Lehe concludes that the “agnostic strain of Byrne’s 
pluralism is too severe. If it is possible that religions are revisable then it is 
false that we are totally lacking means of assessing religious claims” (155).
In chapter 9 and in the book’s Conclusion, Lehe more explicitly pulls 
together the two main topics of his book, namely science and religious di-
versity, and argues that a religion’s degree of harmonization with scientific 
knowledge can be compared with that of other religions, and that this can 
serve as a legitimate and helpful way to adjudicate (to some extent) be-
tween competing religious claims. As an example of how this can go, Lehe 
compares Buddhism and Christian theism. Lehe notes that “Buddhists 
have found support for their doctrine of dependent origination in quan-
tum physics and cosmology” and that “[c]yclical cosmologies seem har-
monious with Buddhist metaphysics”—but he argues that the “universe 
having a beginning is difficult to reconcile with the Buddhist affirmation 
of an eternal, cyclical universe” and that “the fine-tuning of the cosmos 
seems to favor theism over Buddhism” (178).
In the remainder of this review, I’ll move from the project of summary 
to one of making a few critical observations about the book. First, it is per-
spicacious of Lehe to note the (perhaps inevitable) psychological dimen-
sion of forming beliefs about the universe’s origin, whether God exists, etc. 
(see 64–66, 99–100). Lehe references Thomas Nagel’s now-famous state-
ment that he hopes there is no God because he doesn’t want the universe 
to be like that. Then, referring to a more recent work by Nagel, Lehe says, 
“Atheist and naturalist philosopher Thomas Nagel thinks that a purely 
materialistic form of naturalism of the sort that is currently fashionable 
has no chance of explaining the origin of life, consciousness, cognition, 
and the existence of objectively real values” (64). If Nagel is right, then if 
the sort of inflexible, dogmatic commitment to materialism as that pre-
ferred by Harvard geneticist Richard Lewontin (quoted by Lehe, 66) is 
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maintained by “mainstream” science, then “mainstream” science won’t 
ever arrive at accurate explanations of such important features of our uni-
verse. Our worldview preferences and our desires do seem to have a sig-
nificant influence on what beliefs we often form and hold, independently 
of the epistemic relation between those beliefs and relevant evidence (and 
this is a state of affairs from which theists, too, are by no means immune). 
But by taking appropriate note of this psychological dimension of our 
cognitive life, following Lehe, a person may be more cognizant of the im-
portance of keeping an open mind and being sensitive to evidence in the 
formation and maintenance of her beliefs; and this increased cognizance 
could itself be helpful in effecting these important epistemic desiderata.
Second, readers should note some features of the terminology Lehe 
adopts at the beginning of chapter 7. Lehe draws a finer distinction than 
is often drawn in the literature with respect to religious diversity. Typi-
cally, the three views of “exclusivism,” “inclusivism,” and “pluralism” 
are distinguished, which Lehe also does; but then Lehe adds into the mix 
the notion of a “moderate exclusivist,” which he introduces when con-
sidering the soteriological implications of exclusivism. Initially at least, 
Lehe seems to want to define the three main views alethically—i.e., with 
respect to what they say about whether more than one religion can be 
true—and then to consider their soteriological applications. Later in that 
section, however, it is not always clear whether the views are to be primar-
ily distinguished alethically, soteriologically, or both. Lehe defines “mod-
erate exclusivism” as a version of exclusivism which holds that adherents 
of religions other than the essentially true one can achieve salvation. In 
a Christian context, Lehe notes that “[o]ne way of drawing the line be-
tween exclusivism and inclusivism is to hold that the latter acknowledges 
the possibility of salvation for non-Christians while the former does not” 
(123). For some readers, this will be the most familiar way to draw the 
line; and they may then perceive a strange shift of terminological ground: 
Lehe’s “moderate exclusivism” is “inclusivism” on their more familiar 
construal, and “inclusivism” as Lehe uses the term is closer to “pluralism” 
on their more familiar construal. But Lehe believes that this way of draw-
ing the line between exclusivism and inclusivism won’t work very well, 
since “the matter is complicated by the fact that some Christian exclusiv-
ists allow the possibility of salvation for non-Christians” (123). And it is 
these folks, then, whom Lehe calls “moderate exclusivists.”
It seems that what Lehe is after here, at least in part, is a way to sort out 
the difference between what we can set forth as the following soteriologi-
cal propositions:
(1) A person can be saved via adherence to a religion different from the 
essentially true one.
(2) A person can be saved by tacitly adhering to the essentially true re-
ligion’s doctrines and practices while thinking she is only adhering 
to her own (different) religion’s doctrines and practices.
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Lehe’s notion of “moderate exclusivism” captures the idea in (2), while 
his notion of “inclusivism” captures the idea in (1). A general challenge 
facing any philosophical discussion of religious diversity is that the key 
terms of “exclusivism,” “inclusivism,” and “pluralism” tend to straddle 
both alethic and soteriological domains, and this can complicate the dia-
lectic somewhat. But again, readers should simply note that Lehe is using 
terms that may differ from how they have seen them used elsewhere. For 
example, there may be some readers who have thought of themselves as 
“inclusivists” who may be surprised to see that they are labeled “moder-
ate exclusivists” according to Lehe’s terminology.
A third item for comment has to do with Lehe’s set-up regarding the no-
tion of a “worldview.” He describes worldviews as “philosophical frame-
works that organize one’s beliefs about ultimate questions of existence, 
meaning, and value”; they are “a network of beliefs in response to these 
questions.” And he goes on to say that “basic beliefs” that are founda-
tional to one’s worldview are “usually assumed without being supported 
by other beliefs, but they may provide part of the basis for the justification 
of other beliefs that make up one’s worldview” and that “[i]nsofar as basic 
beliefs are assumed without thoroughgoing rational justification, world-
views are to some extent matters of faith” (9). Some readers who are fa-
miliar with the (“foundationalist”) epistemological notion of a “properly 
basic belief” (a belief that is non-inferentially justified) may wonder if this 
is what Lehe has in mind here. It seems that the answer must be “no.” Al-
though Lehe speaks of basic beliefs, this appears to be a general reference 
to the beliefs (including religious beliefs, for many people) that form the 
core of one’s worldview and that may be assumed as a philosophical start-
ing point, largely as articles of faith, but may themselves not be rational 
(at least not initially). So Lehe isn’t offering “reformed epistemology,” the 
view that religious beliefs may be rational by being “properly basic.” And 
his project isn’t really religious evidentialism, either; statements like “reli-
gion is largely a matter of faith” (19) give the impression that his position 
is closer to fideism. But it isn’t easy to pin Lehe down here, since he also 
grants that “[o]ne might have philosophical arguments to support belief,” 
“[o]ne might believe on the basis of religious experience,” and “[b]elief in 
God might, for some persons, be properly basic, as Alvin Plantinga has 
argued” (35). Lehe’s position seems to be that a person is entitled to basic 
assumptions about the world as she forms a worldview, but that “there 
are rational criteria by which the plausibility of worldviews may be as-
sessed” (17)—one being coherence and another being explanatory power. 
And he argues that a theistic worldview scores well in both, particularly 
so with respect to the second criterion, and is on the whole more plausible 
than naturalism.
Overall, then, God, Science, and Religious Diversity is a rigorously-argued, 
well-researched and up-to-date treatment of what are widely perceived 
to be two challenges to religious belief (particularly Christian religious 
belief), one posed by science and the other by religious diversity. The 
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book fulfills the advertisement in its subtitle (“A Defense of Theism”) very 
admirably. To conclude on a somewhat personal note, my first exposure 
to Lehe’s work was by coming across an article of his on the problem of 
divine hiddenness, “A Response to the Argument from the Reasonable-
ness of Nonbelief” (Faith and Philosophy 21 [2004]: 159–174). I found—and 
continue to find—that outstanding article to be the best theistic response 
to this problem in print. I was therefore eager to read God, Science, and 
Religious Diversity upon learning of its recent publication, and the book 
did not disappoint.
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Reviewing Michael McClymond’s 1300-page assault on historic ap-
proaches to universal salvation—also known as Universal Reconciliation 
or Universalism—finds much to acclaim and much to critique. We begin 
with a summary and commendations.
First, this two-volume tome (with twelve chapters and twelve appen-
dices) is a vigorous achievement fueled by McClymond’s conviction that 
proposing universal reconciliation with God distracts from God’s future 
Judgment. For McClymond, Universalism sprouts from a knotty branch of 
Christianity, or is an invasive species driven by gnostic, esoteric, symbolic, 
allegorical, speculative, mystical, Kabbalistic, Cabalistic (differentiating 
Christian modifications of Jewish Kabbalah), and even occult agendas. He 
analyzes ancient Near Eastern, North African, and European Universalists 
whom he identifies with two central streams. He casts the first as descen-
dants of ancient Gnosticism and the second as heirs of modern esoteri-
cism, hypothesizing parallel rivers in Judaism, Islam, Mormonism, and 
Zoroastrianism.
McClymond’s program is precise. The Devil’s Redemption is not dispas-
sionate social history, ethnography, or a comprehensive record of popu-
lar or public opinion. Nor does McClymond document the full range of 
historic or famous Universalists not formally trained as philosophers or 
theologians such as Helen Keller, Florence Nightingale, Clara Barton, 
or Madeleine L’Engle (though he nods to a few of these in one footnote, 
n1129). Biblical exegesis is not a substantial feature with the exception of 
two appendices: “Words and Concepts for Time and Eternity” and “Barth 
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